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PURCHASE MONEY RESULTING TRUSTS"
IN NORTH CAROLINA
J. GLENN EDWARDS* AND M. T. VAN HECKE**
THE GENERAL DOCTRINE
Where one person pays the consideration for the transfer of
property and title is taken in the name of another, the former is pre-
sumptively the beneficiary of a resulting trust.1 The rule has been
stated in the following language by Chief Justice Shepherd:
"It is a well established principle that where, upon the purchase of
property, the legal title is taken in the name of one person while the
consideration is given or paid by another, at the same time or pre-
viously, and as a part of the same transaction, the parties being
strangers to each other, a resulting trust immediately arises from the
transaction, and the person named in the conveyance will be a trustee
for the party from whom the consideration proceeds." 2
This principle has been followed in a long line of decisions in North
Carolina.3
*Third Year Student, University of North Carolina School of Law.
**Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
For an excellent recent treatment of the whole doctrine, see Scott, Result-
ing Trusts Arising Upon the Purchase of Land (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 669.
As to origin, development, and nature of resulting trusts, see AmES, LEc-
TUES Ox LEGAL HIsToRY (1913) 431-434, also printed in (1907) 20 HA v. L. Rxv.
549, 555-557; Costigan, The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting, and
Constructive (1914) 27 HARv. L. REv. 437, 439-448, 455-459; Note (1927) 21
ILL. L. REv. 621.
See also, BoGaEr, TRuSTS (1921) §33; 1 PERRY, TRuSTS AND TRusms (6th
ed. 1911) §§126-130; 1 LSwiN, TRusTs (8th ed. 1888) 163-170; 1 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1920) §107 (c) ; 3 THompsoN, REAL PRoPERTY (1924)
§§2295, 2297-2299; 3 POmEROY, EQUITy JJRIsPRumENcs (4th ed. 1918) §§1037-
1038; BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES or" EQUIrY (10th ed. 1925) §§80-81.
'Summers v. Moore, 113 N. C. 394, 18 S. E. 712 (1893).
'Keaton v. Cobb, 16 N. C. 439 (1830) ; Shelton v. Shelton, 58 N. C. 292
(1859); King v. Weeks, 70 N. C. 372 (1874); Lyon v Akin, 78 N. C. 372
(1878); Cunningham v. Bell, 83 N. C. 328 (1880) ; Beam v. Bridgers, 108 N. C.
276, 13 S. E. 312 (1891) ; Brisco v. Norris, 112 N. C. 671, 16 S. E. 850 (1893) ;
Holden v. Strickland, 116 N. C..185, 21 S. E. 684 (1895) (also an express trust
involved); Houck v. Somers, 118 N. C. 607, 24 S. E. 429 (1896) ; Gorrell v.
Alspaugh, 120 N. C. 362, 27 S. E. 85 (1897) ; Norton v. McDevit, 122 N. C.
755, 30 S. E. 24 (1898) ; McWhirter v. McWhirter, 155 N. C. 145, 71 S. E.
59 (1911); Deese v. Deese, 176 N. C. 527, 97 S. E.-475 (1917); Harris v.
Harris, 178 N. C. 7, 100 S. E. 125 (1919) ; Greensboro Bank v. Scott, 184 N. C.
312, 114 S. E. 475 (1922) ; Tyndall v. Tyndall, 186 N. C. 272, 119 S. E. 354
(1923); Tire Co. v. Lester, 190 N. C. 411, 130 S. E. 45 (1925); Nissen v.
Baker, 198 N. C. 433, 152 S. E. 34 (1930).
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The rule has its foundation in the supposed purpose back of the
payment of the consideration by a person other than the person to
whom the transfer or conveyance is made. The natural presumption
is that the person who supplies the consideration intends the purcliase
for his own benefit, and that the conveyance of the legal title to
another is a matter of convenience and arrangement between them.
4
For this reason, it has been suggested by eminent authority that re-
sulting trusts should be classified as "intent-enforcing" and that
they are in this sense analogous to express trusts.5 The intention of
the parties is gathered from the facts and circumstances of the trans-
action, rather than from any express agreement of the parties, and
it is from this that the habit of referring to resulting trusts as created
by "operation of law" has arisen.6 It would, of course, be more
accurate to say that they are created by implication of fact.
The trust must result, if at all, at the time of the transmission of
the legal estate and as a part of the same transaction. 7 The payment
of the consideration after the deed or conveyance has been executed
and delivered to the grantee comes too late.8 This holding in North
Carolina was placed upon the ground that a parol trust could not be
created in land subsequently to the passage of the legal title.9 How-
ever, one case has held that where one under an inchoate obligation to
pay money, purchased property in his own name which was to be
turned over to the creditor in lieu of cash, a resulting trust was
created.10  This result has been criticized," and it seems open to
'Summers v. Moore, supra note 2; Gorrell v. Alspaugh; Harris v. Harris;
Tyndall v. Tyndall, all supra note 3. The justification of the presumed inten-
tion seems to be founded upon: (1) The ancient equitable principle that the
beneficial interest is drawn to the person paying the consideration. Thurber
v. La Roque, 105 N. C. 301, 11 S. E. 460 (1890); Holden v. Strickland, mipra
note 3; 3 PomERoY, op. cit. supra note 1, §1037. (2) The experience of the
courts in a multitude of litigated cases. Scott, op. cit. .mpra; note 1, at 670.
'Costigan, op. cit. supra note 1, at 462.
'See Thurber v. La Roque, supra note 4; Holden v. Strickland; Houck v.
Somers, both supra note 3; Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 672.
"See Summers v. Moore, supra note 2; Harris v. Harris; Tyndall v. Tyn-
dall, both supra note 3.
'Greensboro Bank v. Gilmer, 117 N. C. 416, 23 S. E. 333 (1895).
" Parol trusts in land may not be created subsequently to the passage of the
legal title in North Carolina. See Lord and Van Hecke, Parol Trusts in North
Carolina (1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 152 and cases cited in note 3.
"Greensboro Bank v. Scott, supra note 3 (one judge dissented on the
ground that this was an oral contract to convey land and void under the con-
tract statute of frauds, C. S. 988).
' The case was criticized on the ground that at the time of the purchase
the alleged beneficiary's performance had three years to run under the con-
tract. It is highly doubtful that the same result would have been reached if
the beneficiary had not, at the time of the suit, lived up to the terms of the
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doubt whether the alleged beneficiary owned the consideration at the
time of the conveyance of the property. While the usual situation is
one where the consideration has been paid in money, it is settled that
the payment of the consideration in any form is sufficient. Thus,
where the consideration furnished was a horse, 12 credit,13 or a con-
tractual right,14 a trust properly resulted. An early case held that
where the person paying the consideration and taking title in himself
had obtained the money wrongfully, no trust, resulting or construc-
tive, could be imposed in favor of the person from whom the consid-
eration was so taken.15 Later cases, however, have imposed a con-
structive trust for his benefit.16
The resulting trust principle embraces personalty as well as
realty.17 If a note, mortgage,' 8 stock, 19 or other personal interest is
purchased by one person in the name of another, a trust results in
favor of the person paying the consideration.
EFFECT OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF Tm PARTIES
(1) Strangers
Where the parties are strangers and the property is purchased in
the name of one with the money of the other, a resulting trust arises
in favor of the payor of the consideration.20 Comparatively few
North Carolina cases have arisen in this situation. This is probably
due to the fact that usually it is possible to prove an oral agreement
before the transfer to hold in trust for the payor of the consideration.
Although Section VII of the English Statute of Frauds2 1 has never
original contract between him and the payor of the consideration, yet the strict
doctrine of resulting trust would have demanded that the same result be
reached. It seems that the court enforced a parol trust and called it a pur-
chase money resulting trust. See (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 509; see also (1923)
9 VA. L. REv. 311; CoSTIGAN, CASES okr TRusTs (1925) 156 note.
'" Norton v. McDevit, supra note 3.
U King v. Weeks, supra note 3.
1Greensboro Bank v. Scott, supra note 3.
U Campbell v. Drake, 39 N. C. 94 (1845) (clerk pilfered money from his
employers store and used it to purchase land).
"6 Edwards v. Culberson, 111 N. C. 342, 16 S. E. 233 (1892) (constructive
trust imposed where purchase money was fraudulently obtained); Bank v.
Crowder, 194 N. C. 312, 139 S. E. 601 (1927) (purchase money wrongfully
taken from bank by cashier).
1 1 PERRY, op. ct. supra note 1, §130.
'Houck v. Somers, supra note 3.
" Barnard v. Hawks, 111 N. C. 333, 16 S. E. 329 (1892) (written agreement
supporting the presumption).
I Barnard v. Hawks, supra note 19; Holden v. Strickland; Gorrell v. Al-
spaugh; Nissen v. Baker, all supra note 3; see Henderson v. Hoke, 21 N. C.
119, 149 (1835) ; Mosely v. Mosely, 87 N. C. 69, 71 (1882).
1 (1676) 29 CAR. IT, c. 3.
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been adopted in North Carolina, such an agreement is not enforceable
as an express parol trust, but sometimes forms the basis of a con-
structive trust.22 The Court has not always determined whether the
trust enforced is express, resulting or constructive.23 This has con-
fused the precedents and, in consequence, constructive trust cases are
sometimes cited as authority for the application of the resulting trust
principle.
24
(2) Partners in Business
Where a partner purchases property with partnership funds and
takes title in himself, a resulting trust arises in favor of the firm.2 5
But if the funds so taken and used are charged against the individual
partner on the firm books, with the knowledge of the other partners,
then the relationship of debtor and creditor is created between the
partner and the firm and there can be no resulting trust.20 Since a
partner occupies a fiduciary relationship to the firm, it would not
seem necessary to resort to the doctrine of resulting trusts in this
situation, because a constructive trust could always be imposed for
the breach of the duty owed the firm by the individual partner.27
The position of a partner in this situation is strongly analogous to
that of an agent who applies the funds of his principal to a purchase
in his own name,28 or of a cashier of a bank who so uses the money
of the bank.2 9 In these cases, constructive trusts have been imposed,
and it is believed that the same rule should be applied to partners.
(3) Husband and Wife
Where the consideration is furnished by the wife and the title is
taken in the name of the husband, there is a resulting trust in favor
of the wife.3 0 In a few states, the presumption of a gift is indulged
" Lord and Van Hecke, op. cit. upra note 9.
"Hargrave v. King, 40 N. C. 430 (1848) (principles confused) ; Leggett v.
Leggett, 88 N. C. 108 (1883) (not clear as to whether resulting or con-
structive).
"For example, see Greensboro Bank v. Scott, supra note 3.
King v. Weeks, supra note 3.
"Lassiter v. Stainback, 119 N. C. 103, 25 S. E. 726 (1896).
' 3 PomEaoy, op. cit. supra note 1, §1049. But see Bogert, op. cit. spra
note 1, §34.
"Rush v. McPherson, 176 N. C. 572, 97 S. E. 613 (1918).
' Bank v. Crowder, supra note 16.
"Lyon v. Akin; Cunningham v. Bell; Beam v. Bridgers, all supra note 3:
Ross v. Hendrix, 110 N. C. 403, 30 S. E. 24 (1892); Brisco v. Norris; Houck
v. Somers, both supra note 3; Hendren v. Hendren, 153 N. C. 505, 69 S. E.
506 (1910); McWhirter v. McWhirter; Deese v. Deese; Tyndall v. Tyndall;
Tire Co. v. Lester, all supra note 3; cf. Faggart v. Bost, 122 N. C. 517, 29 S. E.
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in this situation ;31 but in North Carolina, the presumption of a gift
is based upon the duty to support rather than love and affection.
8 2
As the Constitution of 1868 changed, in some respects, the capacity
of married women to hold property, it is necessary to consider here
the law before and after that date.
33
Prior to the Constitution of 1868, the personal property of the
wife became the property of the husband jure mnriti upon being re-
duced to possession -by him. Consequently, where funds derived
from the sale of the wife's realty came into the hands of her husband,
such funds became his property and there was no occasion for the
application of the principle of resulting trusts to any land bought
with them-for the obvious reason that the consideration had be-
longed to him jure nariti.3 4 However, the husband might agree to
treat such funds, or funds coming to the wife by inheritance, as her
own. As such an agreement was enforceable, and as a married
woman could hold land despite her husband,8 5 the resulting trust prin-
ciple was applicable to property purchased therewith. 6 Again, where
the wife was an infant and her realty was sold under order of court,
the proceeds were hers and could be used to create a resulting trust.
3 7
But if the husband came into possession of the personalty of his wife
after 1868, even though the marriage took place prior to that date, the
property did not become his jure naritL38 It thus becomes evident
that the rule relating to resulting trusts was not, in itself, affected,
but that the only question of importance in this connection was
whether the consideration was the property of the wife.
After the Constitution of 1868, when the rights of the husband
jure ntariti had been abolished, the situation where the wife paid the
833 (1898) (constructive trust imposed on facts that would support a resulting
trust).
"CosTIGAir, CASES ON TRUSTS (!925) 779; (1924) 8 MINN. L. REv. 553.
" North Carolina is in accord with the weight of authority in this. See
BOGERT, TausTs 111.
" A valuable treatment of this phase of the law of resulting trusts in North
Carolina is found in 1 MORDECAi, LAW LEcTURES (1916) 312-316.
"Temple v. Williams, 39 N. C. 39 (1845) ; Hackett v. Shuford, 86 N. C.
144 (1882); Giles v. Hunter, 103 N. C. 194, 9 S. E. 549 (1889); Benbow v.
Moore, 114 N. C. 263, 19 S. E. 156 (1894).
"Woodruff v. Bowles, 104 N. C. 197, 10 S. E. 482 (1889); see Rouse v.
Lee, 59 N. C. 352 (1863) ; 1 MORDECAI, op. cit. supra note 33, at 313.
Cunningham v. Bell, supra note 3; cf. Dula v. Young, 70 N. C. 450 (1874)
(constructive trust imposed on account of the confidential relation of the
parties).
'Lyon v. Akin, supra note 3.
'Kirkpatrick v. Holmes, 108 N. C. 206, 12 S. E. 1037 (1891); Beam v.
Bridgers, supra note 3.
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consideration and title was taken in the name of the husband became
substantially equivalent to the situation where the parties were
strangers.8 9 Even so, there remain certain distinctive features.
Where a wife paid the purchase money and took title in the names of
herself and her husband, intending to make a gift to him of an undi-
vided interest, but the deed was not executed in the manner required
by the statute4" relating to conveyances by married women, the hus-
band held his record interest upon resulting trust for her. 41 Even if
the husband is a resulting trustee in favor of his wife he still has, in
proper instances, a right of curtesy in the land.42 But if the wife is a
resulting trustee in favor of another, he does not have a right of
curtesy in the land.43 Most of the resulting trust litigation in North
Carolina has related to married women. Aside from the obvious
financial incidents of the relationship, this may be due, in part, to the
fact that a married woman cannot create a trust in land by parol, 44
and that where an express oral agreement might otherwise be relied
upon, resort has been had to the resulting trust principle to obtain a
recovery in her favor.
Where the husband furnishes the consideration and title is taken
in the name of the wife, there is no resulting trust in favor of the
husband but a presumption of a gift or provision on the part of the
husband for the wife's benefit. 45 This presumption arises out of the
relationship of the parties and is based upon the legal and moral obli-
"Cases cited supra note 3 and note 30.
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1927) §2515.
4" Deese v. Deese, supra note 3. It is difficult to conceive of the deed being
a nullity as to the husband's interest and of his holding anything on trust. But
the resulting trust device here became a substitute for the removal of a cloud
on title subject to the husband's right of curtesy. The statute relating to con-
veyances by married women seems inapplicable.
" Lyon v. Akin, supra note 3; Kirkpatrick v. Holmes, 108 N. C. 206, 12
S. E. 1037 (1891); Norcum v. Savage, 140 N. C. 472, 53 S. E. 289 (1906);
Deese v. Deese; Tyndall v. Tyndall, both scpra note 3.
" Norton v. McDevit, supra note 3.
" N. C. CoDe ANN. (Michie, 1927) §2515; Ricks v. Wilson, 154 N. C. 284,
70 S. E. 476 (1911) (wife cannot create a trust by parol, or otherwise except,
by embodying it in a written instrument, to which her privy examination
must be taken in accordance with the statute) ; Deese v. Deese, supra note 3
(gift of realty to husband invalid unless executed in accordance with the
statute).
"3Arrington v. Arrington, 114 N. C. 116, 19 S. E. 278 (1894); Evans v.
Cullens, 122 N. C. 55, 28 S. E. 961 (1898); Ricks v. Wilson, sipra note 44;
Maxton Realty Co. v. Carter, 170 N. C. 5, 86 S. E. 714 (1915) ; see Whitten
v. Peace, 188 N. C. 298, 302, 124 S. E. 571 (1924) ; BoGERT, TRUSTS 109-110;
Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, 682-683.
The same rule is applicable where the conveyance is directly from husband
to wife. Singleton v. Cherry, 168 N. C. 402, 84 S. E. 698 (1915).
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gation of the husband to support his wife.46 The rule is the same
where the husband has placed improvements on the land of his wife,
47
where he paid owelty money for his wife in partition proceedings, 48
and where he paid only a part of the purchase money.49 The rule is
also applicable where the husband deposits money in a bank in his
wife's name, which is subsequently used for the purchase of realty by
the wife in her own name.50
(4) Parent and Child
Where the consideration is furnished -by a parent and the title is
placed in the name of a child, there is a presumption of an advance-
ment to the child.8 ' This, like the presumption of a gift from hus-
band to wife, seems to have been based upon the legal duty to support,
rather than upon love and affection. This presumption would prob-
ably be extended to one in loco parentis.52 But where a child fur-
nishes the consideration and title is made to one of the parents, there
is a presumption of a resulting trust.5
(5) Other Relations
Where the relation between the payor and grantee is that of
brothers, 54 sisters,55 uncle and nephew,58 or any other except that of
husband and wife and parent and child, there is the normal presump-
tion of a resulting trust because of the absence of a legal duty of
support.
" Ricks v. Wilson, supra note 44; see Thurber v. La Roque, supra note 4.
Scott, loc. cit. supra note 45, says that the test is whether the grantee is the
natural object of the payor's bounty, and this is a more realistic test than that
expressed by the North Carolina authorities.
,' Nelson v. Nelson, 176 N. C. 191, 96 S. E. 906 (1918) ; Anderson v. Ander-
son, 177 N. C. 401, 97 S. E. 212 (1919); cf. Kearney v. Vann, 154 N. C. 311,
70 S. E. 747 (1911) (materialman's lien disallowed).
"Sprinkle v. Spainhour, 149 N. C. 223, 62 S. E. 910 (1908).
"See Thurber v. La Roque, supra note 4.
Flanner v. Butler, 131 N. C. 151, 42 S. E. 557 (1902).
Ricks v. Wilson, supra note 44; cf. Edgerton v. Jones, 107 N. C. 284, 12
S. E. 434 (1890). As to advancements generally, see Nobles v. Davenport,
183 N. C. 207, 111 S. E. 180 (1922), 26 A. L. R. 1086 (1923); Note (1923) 26
A. L. R. 1089.
" It has been so held in other states. Harris v. Elliot, 45 W. Va. 245, 32
S. E. 176 (1898) ; Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, 682 and note 51. North Carolina
has sustained a covenant to stand seized where grantor was in loco pareltis to
grantee. Pickett v. Garrard, 131 N. C. 195, 42 S. E. 579 (1902) ; cf. Blount v.
Blount, 4 N. C. 389 (1816) (same situation except grantor was not in loco
parentis).
"Norton v. McDevit, supra note 3.
" Harris v. Harris, supra note 3.
'Keaton v. Cobb, supra note 3.
' Summers v. Moore, supra note 2; Greensboro Bank v. Scott, supra note 3.
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LEGAL TITLE TAKEN AS SECURITY
(1) Resulting Trust Cases
A mere loan of money from A to B is not sufficient to raise a
resulting trust in favor of A in property purchased by B with the
money loaned. The only effect of such a transaction is to create the
relation of creditor and debtor between A and B.57 But if B borrows
money from A with which to buy land and has the land conveyed to
A as security, a resulting trust will arise in favor of B, subject to A's
security interest, for it is really B's money that has been paid for
the land.58
(2) Express Oral Agreements
Certain cases beyond the scope of the resulting trust principle
seem pertinent here because they grow out of oral agreements to buy
and hold land subject to the right of another to repay the purchase
price and demand a conveyance of the property. These cases fall
principally into the following groups: (1) Where A purchases B's
land at a judicial sale under an oral agreement to do so and to hold
for B until B repays the purchase money ;59 (2) Where A purchases
property on which B has an option under an agreement to do so and
to hold for B until B repays him ;8o (3) Where A and B have agreed
to purchase jointly and A surreptitiously purchases the property in his
own name and for his own benefit;61 (4) Where A, as B's agent
under an agreement, purchases property in his own name in breach of
his agreement and fiduciary relation. 62 Relief has been given in all
of these situations, either by way of a constructive trust or by en-
' Lassiter v. Stainback, supra note 26; In re Gorham, 173 N. C. 372, 91
S. E. 950 (1917).
' Gorrell v. Alspaugh, supra note 3 (resulting trust distinguished from a
mortgage).
Neely v. Torian, 21 N. C. 410 (1836) ; Tankard v. Tankard, 84 N. C. 286
(1881); Cheek v. Watson, 85 N. C. 195 (1881); Coble v. Branson, 98 N. C.
160, 3 S. E. 715 (1887) ; McNair v. Pope, 100 N. C. 404, 6 S. E. 234 (1888);
Hinton v. Pritchard, 107 N. C. 128, 12 S. E. 242, 10 L. R. A. 201 (1890); Cobb
v. Edwards, 117 N. C. 244, 23 S. E. 241 (1895) ; Owen v. Williams, 130 N. C.
165, 41 S. E. 93 (1902) ; Lutz v. Hoyle, 167 N. C. 632, 83 S. E. 749 (1914) ;
Wilson v. Jones, 176 N. C. 205, 97 S. E. 18 (1918) ; McNinch v. American
Trust Co., 183 N. C. 33, 110 S. E. 663 (1922); Cunningham v. Long, 186
N. C. 526, 120 S. E. 116 (1923).
' Sykes v. Boone, 132 N. C. 199, 43 S. E. 645 (1903) ; Avery v. Stewart,
136 N. C. 426, 48 S. E. 775 (1904); Russel v. Wade, 146 N. C. 116, 59 S. E.
345 (1907); Anderson v. Harrington, 163 N. C. 140, 79 S. E. 426 (1913);
Allen v. Gooding, 173 N. C. 93, 91 S. E. 694 (1917).
" Brogden v. Gibson, 165 N. C. 16, 80 S. E. 966 (1914); Lefkowitz V.
Silver, 182 N. C. 339, 109 S. E. 56, 23 A. L. R. 1491 (1921).
Pegues v. Pegues, 40 N. C. 418 (1848) ; Rush v. McPerson, supra note 28.
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forcement of the oral agreement, notwithstanding the contract Statute
of Frauds.68
PAYMENT OF A PART OF THE CONSIDERATION
Where the claimant of a resulting trust has paid only a part of
the consideration, it is held in North Carolina that if the amount paid
is certain and definite a trust will result in proportion to the amount
of the consideration furnished, or, to use the language of the court,
"to the extent of the purchase money furnished."6 4 This is the pro-
portionate or pro tanto rule as distinguished from that interpretation
of the so-called "aliquot part rule" which has caused some courts to
require the proportion of the consideration furnished to be an exact
fraction of the whole with nothing left over.6 5 Where a husband and
wife have contributed equally in the payment of the consideration and
the deed is made to husband and wife, a tenancy by the entirety is
created,66 unless a contrary intention of creating a tenancy in com-
mon appears.
67
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONs
In North Carolina an action to have a party declared a trustee is
barred by the lapse of ten years after the cause of action accrues.6 8
' N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1927) §988. See Lord and Van Hecke, op. cit.
supra note 9; Costigan, Tru sts Based on Oral Promises to Hold in Trust, to
Convey, or to Devise, Made by Voluntary Grantees (1914) 12 MicH. L. REv.
423, 425-429, 444-446; Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 10.
Costigan (ibid.) would impose a constructive trust, if anything, in these
cases. But this would seem unnecessary in North Carolina because such oral
agreements made contemporaneously or prior to the purchase may create valid
express parol trusts. It seems fair to say that North Carolina, due to the
fact just stated, -has not with any consistency classified these cases as parol or
constructive. What appears to be the situation is that these trusts have been
enforced as parol with the court resorting to theories of constructive trusts
to bolster up the doctrine.
"Keaton v. Cobb; Norton v. Mcflevit; Harris v. Harris, all supra note 3;
see Cunningham v. Bell ("to extent of purchase money furnished") ; Holden
v. Strickland (same); McWhirter v. McWhirter (same), all supra note 3.
Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, 692-702 (an excellent discussion); BOGERT,
TRUSTS 105-109; COSTIGAN, CASES ON TRUSTS (1925) 790.
Scott (ibid.) says: "Strictly speaking, of course, an aliquot part is one
which is exactly contained in the whole without a remainder, that is, a part
which can be expressed by a fraction which when reduced to its lowest terms
has unity for its numerator.... It has been explained, however, that it is not
intended that the term should be taken in its strict mathematical sense in that
it was intended to mean a particular fraction of the whole as distinguished
from a general contribution to the purchase money."
'Ray v. Long, 132 N. C. 891, 44 S. E. 652 (1903), s. c. 128 N. C. 90, 38
S. E. 291 (1901) ; Murchison v. Fogleman, 165 N. C. 397, 81 S. E. 627 (1914).
Stalcup v. Stalcup, 137 N. C. 305, 49 S. E 210 (1904).
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1927) §445 provides that actions not otherwise
provided for must be commenced within ten years after the cause of action
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In the case of an express trust, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the relation of trustee and beneficiary has ceased,
or has been repudiated by the trustee to the knowledge of the ben-
eficiary.69 The same rule has been applied in North Carolina in
actions to declare a party a resulting trustee.70 In Faggart v. Bost,
1
Furches, J., said that in constructive trusts a different rule was ap-
plicable and that the "statute was emphatically one of repose" and
began to run from the date of the fraud for which the constructive
trust was imposed; but this distinction seems to have been forgotten
in the maze of subsequent decisions. Aside from the statute of
limitations, a party seeking to have another declared a resulting trus-




A resulting trust arises from a presumption which has as its log-
ical basis the supposed intention of the parties78 Where it appears
from the facts that the consideration was paid by one person and the
title was taken in the name of a stranger, a presumption arises sup.
plying an intention on the part of the payor to benefit himself and
not to make a gift to one whom he is under no obligation to support.
74
However, this presumption does not arise where the payor is under a
legal duty to support the grantee. If the grantee is the wife of the
payor, a presumption of a gift is indulged ;7r if a child, then a pre-
accrues. This has been held applicable to actions to declare a party a trustee.
Phillips v. Lumber Co., 151 N. C. 519, 66 S. E. 603 (1909).
'Fowle Memorial Hospital v. Nicholson, 190 N. C. 119, 129 S. E. 149
(1925); McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcncE AND PROCEMURE (1929) 131;
2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, 2002-2006.
' Sexton v. Farrington, 185 N. C. 339, 117 S. E. 172 (1923).
The statute does not commence to run where the beneficiary has been in
continuous possession. Norton v. McDevit, supra note 3 (possession of a part
held sufficient) ; Flanner v. Butler, 131 N. C. 155, 42 S. E. 547 (1902) (con-
structive possession).
Faggart v. Bost, supra note 30.
'Marshall v. Hammock, 195 N. C. 498, 140 S. E. 216 (1928).
", Summers v. Moore, supra note 2; Harris v. Harris; Tyndall v. Tyndall;
Tire Co. v. Lester, all supra note 3. But cf. Houck v. Summers, sipra note 3.
3 JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 1926) §§1444-1447.
See generally on presumptions, 5 WIGmORI, EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 1923)
§§2490-2496; McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof
(1927) 5 N. C. L. REv. 291.
The presumption of a resulting trust is a legal descendent of the old pre-
sumption of a resulting use. Costigan, op. cit. supra note 1, 446.
' Summers v. Moore, supra note 2; cases cited mpra note 3.
" Supra note 45.
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sumption of an advancement arises.7 6 It is to be noted that the
presumption of a resulting trust and the presumption of a gift or of
an advancement are opposite and contrary in their operation and
effect. The presumption of a resulting trust operates in favor of the
payor, whereas the presumption of a gift or of an advancement
operates in favor of the title-holder.
There is a substantial difference in the intensity of the proof
necessary in establishing the facts from which these presumptions
arise. In North Carolina, the facts from which the presumption of a
resulting trust arises must -be established by proof that is "dear,
strong, and convincing."77 Whether the proof measures up to this
test is a question that must be determined by the jury.78 Thus, the
party in whose favor the presumption of a resulting trust operates is
handicapped by an extraordinary burden of persuasion. 79
(2) Rebutting the Presumption
The presumptions discussed above are all rebuttable. Since they
are based on the supposed intention of the parties, when they are
repelled by proof of an actual intention to the contrary they lose their
force and efficacy. Generally speaking, they may be rebutted by
proof of an intention contrary to that which the law would supply.80
In North Carolina, this presumption has been rebutted by an agree-
ment showing a contrary intention,"' and by showing that a loan was
intended.82 Again, where it has -been shown that the equitable interest
of the alleged beneficiary had been lost by acquiescence amounting
to estoppel, this was held sufficient to rebut.88 The presumption of
" Supra note 51; Note (1923) 26 A. L. R. 1106.
'Clement v. Clement, 54 N. C. 184 (1854) ; Shelton v. Shelton, supra note
3; McWhirter v. McWhirter, supra note 3; Glenn v. Glenn, 169 N. C. 729, 86
S. E. 622 (1915) ; Harris v. Harris; Tire Co. v. Lester, both supra note 3.
This is admittedly a judicial borrowing from the rule relating to the estab-
lishment of parol express trusts. Cobb v. Edwards, supra note 59; Lefkowitz
v. Silver, supra note 61.
" Cunningham v. Bell; McWhirter v. McWhirter; Tire Co. v. Lester, all
supra note 3. Rule again is the same as in parol trust cases. Cobb v. Edwards,
supra note 59; Lefkowitz v. Silver, supra note 61.
5 WIGmORE, EviENCE §2498.
Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, 679-681 (resulting trust), 683 and note 61
(gift); 3 JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENcE §1446.
'"Foy v. Foy, 3 N. C. 131 (1801) ; Ferguson v. Haas, 64 N. C. 772 (1870);
Rush v. McPerson, supra note 26; see Kirkpatrick v. Holmes, fapral note 38
("in absence of agreement to the contrary") ; Ross v. Hendrix, supra note 30
(same); Tire Co. v. Lester, supra note 3 ("unless a contrary intention pre-
vents").
" Lassiter v. Stainback, upra note 26; In re Gorham, supra note 57.
'" Marshall v. Hammock, supra note 72.
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a gift or an advancement may be rebutted by showing that title was
put in the alleged beneficiary without the knowledge or consent of the
person furnishing the consideration,8 4 that the consideration did not
belong to the person who paid it,85 or that a gift would be a fraud
upon creditors.8 6 A husband may rebut the presumption of a gift of
improvements placed on his wife's land by showing that they were so
located under a bona fide mistake.8 7 A declaration in a husband's
will that his wife never paid any of the consideration for land held
in her name has no rebutting force whatsoever since it does not
indicate that the husband, though he furnished the money, did not
intend a gift.8 8 The mere fact of a subsequent divorce,8 9 or of sub-
sequent separation 90 is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of a
gift from the husband to the wife.
CONCLUSION
North Carolina has, on the whole, applied the orthodox doctrine
of purchase money resulting trusts. Although it has produced much
litigation and perhaps some perjury, the device seems to have worked
fairly well. It is believed that the adoption of statutes9 ' found in
a number of other states would not only enhance the present difficul-
ties but would also create new ones. They have abolished the pur-
chase money resulting trust, except in a few instances, and have made
unusual provisions for creditors. The anxiety of litigants to crowd
their cases into these loopholes has produced as many cases as the
system with which we are familiar. Probably the most that can be
'done in this field is that which this paper has been aimed at, namely,
the ascertainment by the courts and lawyers of the precise limits of
what can and of what cannot be accomplished by the device, legit-
imately used.
"Flanner v. Butler, 131 N. C. 155, 42 S. E. 547 (1902).
"Bank v. Crowder, supra note 16.
"A resulting trust is imposed in favor of creditors. Thurber v. La Roque,
supra note 4. But the donor himself cannot impeach the transaction. Respass
v. Jones, 102 N. C. 5, 8 S. E. 770 (1899) ; Flanner v. Butler, Mspra note 70;
cf. Edgerton v. Jones, supra note 51. Nor can he have the benefit of a result-
ing trust where the title is made to a stranger. Turner v. Elford, 58 N. C.
106 (1859).
"Pritchard v. Williams, 176 N. C. 108, 96 S. E. 733 (1918), s. c. 175
N. C. 319, 95 S. E. 570 (1918) ; see Anderson v. Anderson, supra note 47.
See Whitten v. Peace, 188 N. C. 298, 124 S. E. 571 (1924).
Arrington v. Arrington, supra note 45.
SNelson v. Nelson, supra note 47."Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, 675-678; BoomsR, TRUSTS 111-112.
